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Abstract
This paper presents a formal specification of the Controller Area Net-
work (CAN) protocol using FocusST framework. We formally describe
core components of the protocol, which provides a basis for further formal
analysis using the Isabelle/HOL theorem prover.
1 Introduction
Controller Area Network (CAN) protocol is one of the standard communication
protocols used in automotive systems. CAN was developed by Robert Bosch
GmbH [3] and is a part of the ISO 11898 standard [10].
In this paper, we present a formal specification of this protocol using Fo-
cusST framework. FocusST was introduced as an extension of the Focus
language, see [4, 24]. Similarly to Focus, specifications in FocusST are based
on the notion of streams, and a formal meaning of a specification is exactly
this external input/output relation. However, in the original Focus input and
output streams of a component are mappings of natural numbers to single mes-
sages,whereas a FocusST stream is a mapping from natural numbers to lists of
messages within the corresponding time intervals. Moreover, the syntax of Fo-
cusST is particularly devoted to specify spatial (S) and timing (T) aspects in a
comprehensible fashion, which is the reason to extend the name of the language
by ST .
The FocusST specification layout was then discussed in [20]. Here, we
present only a small subset of that we applied to specify the CAN protocol:
• 〈〉 denotes an empty stream;
• dom.s yields the list [1...#s], where #s denotes the length of the stream
s;
• rng.s converts the stream s into a set of its elements : {s.j | j ∈ dom.s};
• The predicate msgn(s) is true iff the stream s has at every time interval
at most n messages.
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SystemArch glass-box
Figure 1: Logical architecture of a CAN-based system
2 Specification of a CAN-based system
Figure 1 presents the specification SystemArch, which describes a logical archi-
tecture of a CAN-based system. We define the following the data types for this
specification: AMessage represents the data type of messages, which are sent
by one automotive application to another:
type AMessage = msg(id : N, data : Data)
Message will denote the CAN-internal messages, and Req will be a simple re-
quest type to denote the CAN requsts to the system bufferes.
type Message = N | Data
type Req = N
The core system requirements are defined by the following specification
CAN , where the assumption is that all data streams asi (which CAN receives
from the automotive application components via the corresponding buffer com-
ponents) satisfy the msg1(asi) predicate, i.e., all these streams must have at
every time interval at most one message. The guarantee part of this specifica-
tion has two predicates that define
1. all data streams ari (which CAN sends to the the corresponding automo-
tive application components) satisfy the msg1(ari) predicate,
2. the data transmission is correct as per the predicate MessageTransmission.
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CAN timed
in as1, . . . , asn : AMessage
out ar1, . . . , arn : AMessage; r1, . . . , rn : Req
asm
1 ∀ i ∈ [1..n]. msg1(as1)
gar
1 ∀ i ∈ [1..n]. msg1(ar1)
2 MessageTransmission(as1, . . . , asn , ar1, . . . , arn , r1, . . . , rn)
Note, that in contrast to the FocusST specification of FlexRay [6, 7, 8, 21, 23],
where the correct transmission means the transmission according the FlexRay
scheduling tables, in the case of CAN the correct transmission is specified ac-
cording the priority relations, see below.
MessageTransmission
as1, . . . , asn : AMessage
∞;
ar1, . . . , arn : AMessage
∞; r1, . . . , rn : Req ∞
∀ t ∈ N :
1 (∀ i ∈ [1..n] : asti = 〈〉) → ∀ j ∈ [1..n] : ar t+2j = 〈〉
2 ∀ i , j ∈ [1..n] : ar ti = ar tj
3 ∃ i ∈ [1..n] : asti 6= 〈〉 ∧ id(ft.asti ) = MinNatList(x )→
r t+2i 6= 〈〉 ∧ ∀ j ∈ [1..n] : ar t+2j = asti
where x = TakeIds(y)
y = CollectElements(n, ast1, . . . , as
t
n)
We also defined the following auxiliary functions to specify the MessageTransmission
predicate:
• TakeIds takes as an input a finite list of type AMessage and returns the
corresponding finite list of the identifiers.
• CollectElements describes collection of all data received by CAN at a
particular time interval.
• MinNatList finds the smallest element in a finite list of natural numbers.
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TakeIds
AMessage ∗ → N ∗
1 TakeIds(〈〉) = 〈〉
2 TakeIds(〈x 〉_ y) = 〈id(x )〉_TakeIds(y)
CollectElements
N× · · · ×M ∗ ×M ∗ → M ∗
1 CollectElements(0, s1, . . . , sn) = 〈〉
2 CollectElements(i + 1, s1, . . . , sn) =
if si+1 = 〈〉
then CollectElements(i , s1, . . . , sn)
else si+1_CollectElements(i , s1, . . . , sn)
fi
MinNatList
N× · · · × N ∗ → N
1 MinNatList(a, 〈〉) = a
2 MinNatList(a, 〈x 〉_ y) =
if a ≤ x
then MinNatList(a, y)
else MinNatList(x , y)
fi
We specify a CAN-buffer in FocusST as a component Buffer , see below.
This component has two input streams (data from an automotive application
and requests from CAN). The only assumption on the inputs is that the data
stream from an automotive application must have at most one message per each
time unit. The output stream will also have at most one message per each time
unit. In the even time intervals, the buffer’s output stream will be empty, where
in the even time intervals it will send the stored data to the CAN component.
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Buffer timed
in a AMessage; r : Req
out as : AMessage
local buf , b ∈ AMessage ∗
init buf = 〈〉; b = 〈〉
asm
1 msg1(a)
gar
1 msg1(as)
∀ t ∈ N :
2 even(t)→ ast = 〈〉
3 odd(t)→ ast = b
4 r t = 〈〉 → b′ = b ∧ buf ′ = newbuf
5 r t 6= 〈〉 ∧ buf = 〈〉 → b′ = at ∧ buf ′ = 〈〉
6 r t 6= 〈〉 ∧ buf 6= 〈〉 → b′ = ft.newbuf ∧ buf ′ = rt.newbuf
where newbuf = if at = 〈〉 then buf else PrAdd(buf , ft.at) fi
The auxiliary function PrAdd specifies the buffer update according to the
priorities of the messages. A lower value of the identifier means a higher priority.
PrAdd
AMessage ∗ ×AMessage → AMessage ∗
1 PrAdd(〈〉, a) = 〈a〉
2 PrAdd(〈x 〉_ y , a) =
if id(a) < id(x )
then 〈a〉_〈x 〉_ y
else 〈x 〉_PrAdd(y , a)
fi
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3 Specification of a CAN component
Figure 2 presents the specification CANArch, which describes a logical archi-
tecture of a CAN protocol component. Each system node will be coordinated
using the corresponding Controller component, where the communication be-
tween controllers will go through the Wire component.
CANArch glass-box
Figure 2: Logical architecture of a CAN component
The Wire component has two assumptions on the input streams:
• all streams wsi , 1 ≤ i ≤ n (CAN messages sent by Controller components,
where n is the number of controllers, i.e., the number of CAN nodes in
the system) must have at most one message per each time interval;
• at each time interval, if one of the streams wsi , 1 ≤ i ≤ n is nonempty
and carries an element of type N then all other streams wsj , 1 ≤ j ≤ n,
j neqi must be either empty or carry an element of type N;
• at each time interval, if one of the streams wsi , 1 ≤ i ≤ n is nonempty
and carries an element of type Data then all other streams wsj , 1 ≤ j ≤ n,
j neqi must be either empty or carry an element of type Data;
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Wire timed
in ws1, ...,wsn : Message
out wr : Message
asm
1 ∀ i ∈ [1..n] : msg1(wsi)
2 ∀ t ∈ N :
∃ i ∈ [1..n]. wsti 6= 〈〉 →
(ft.wsti ∈ N→ ∀ j ∈ [1..n]. (wstj = 〈〉 ∨ ft.wsti ∈ N))
∧
(ft.wsti ∈ Data → ∀ j ∈ [1..n]. (wstj = 〈〉 ∨ ft.wsti ∈ Data))
gar
1 msg1(wr)
2 wr0 = 〈〉
3 ∀ t ∈ N : wr t+1 = Broadcast(currentData)
where
currentData = CollectElements(n,wst1, . . . ,ws
t
n)
Broadcast
Message ∗ → r : Message ∗
1 Broascast(〈〉) = 〈〉
2 Broascast(〈x 〉_ y)
if x ∈ N
then 〈MinNatList(x , y)〉
else 〈x 〉
fi
A Controller component is also composite, the specification of its logical ar-
chitecture is presented in Figure 3. Controller consists of three sub-components:
• Encoder that converts the automotive application messages into CAN mes-
sages,
• Decoder that ensures the reverse transformation, where CAN messages
are decoded into the automotive application messages,
• LogicalLayer that ensures that CAN bus behaves correctly.
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ControllerArch glass-box
Figure 3: Logical architecture of a Controller component
The Encoder component assumes that its input stream of type AMessage
can have at most one message per time interval. As soon as this component
receives a message, it forwards its identifier to the logical level it the same time
interval and sends the actual data part in the next time interval. If we specify
this behaviour simply by
∀ t ∈ N :
(1) ast = 〈〉 → mst = 〈〉
(2) ast 6= 〈〉 → mst = 〈id(ast)〉 ∧ mst+1 = 〈data(ast)〉
We will have many contradictions. Thus, assume that ast 6= 〈〉 and ast+1 = 〈〉.
From (1) we can conclude that mst+1 = 〈〉. However, from (2) it follows that
mst+1 = 〈data(ast)〉. Also, in the case ast 6= 〈〉 and ast+1 6= 〈〉, we would
have mst+1 = 〈data(ast)〉 because ast 6= 〈〉, and at the same time mst+1 =
〈id(ast+1)〉 because ast+1 6= 〈〉. Thus, we have to use a state variable to ensure
the correct modelling. Let us call this variable e. A simple Boolean type will
be enough to specify the correct behaviour: the true value will denote the state
of active encoding process, where the false value (which will be also the initial
value for e) would mean that no encoding is currently performed.
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Encoder timed
in as : AMessage
out ms : Message
local e ∈ Bool;
init e = false
asm
1 msg1(as)
gar
1 msg1(ms)
∀ t ∈ N :
2 (e = false ∧ ast = 〈〉)→
(mst = 〈〉 ∧ e ′ = false)
3 (e = false ∧ ast 6= 〈〉)→
(mst = 〈id(ast)〉 ∧ mst+1 = 〈data(ast)〉 ∧ e ′ = true)
4 e = true→ (mst = 〈data(ast−1)〉 ∧ e ′ = false)
The aim of the Decoder component is to build an output message of type
AMessage out of two consequently received input messages, where the first input
message must be of type N and the second input message must be of type Data.
This property is specifies as the following predicate:
MsgCANFormat
s ∈ Message ∞
∀ t ∈ N :
1 st 6= 〈〉 ∧ ft.st ∈ N →
st+1 6= 〈〉 ∧ ft.st ∈ Data)
2 st 6= 〈〉 ∧ ft.st ∈ Data →
t > 0 ∧ st−1 6= 〈〉 ∧ ft.st−1 ∈ N)
Thus, the Decoder component assumes that at each time interval it can
receive at most one message, and if the message is non-empty and of type N,
the next time interval will of the input stream will contain data. We will use a
local variable d of type Bool to denote that the decoding process is in progress:
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the true value will denote the state of active decoding process, where the false
value (which will be also the initial value for d) would mean that no decoding
is currently performed.
Decoder timed
in mr : Message
out ar : AMessage
local d ∈ Bool
init d = false
asm
1 msg1(mr)
1 MsgCANFormat(mr)
gar
1 msg1(ar)
∀ t ∈ N :
2 mr t = 〈〉 → (ar t = 〈〉 ∧ d ′ = false)
3 mr t 6= 〈〉 ∧ d = false→
(ar t = 〈〉 wedge d ′ = true)
4 mr t 6= 〈〉 ∧ d = true→
(ar t = 〈msg(ft.mr t−1, ft.mr t)〉 ∧ d ′ = false)
The LogicalLayer component assumes that both its input stream of type
Message can have at most one message per time interval and fulfil the property
MsgFormat . All three its output streams also should have at most one message
per time interval, where the mr -stream that goes to the Decoder component
should in addition fulfil the property MsgFormat .
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LogicalLayer timed
in ms,wr : Message
out mr ,ws : Message; r : Req
local lid ∈ N
init lid = 0
asm
1 msg1(ms)
2 msg1(mr)
3 MsgFormat(ms)
4 MsgFormat(mr)
gar
1 msg1(ws)
2 msg1(r)
3 msg1(mr)
4 MsgFormat(mr)
5 ∀ t ∈ N : mr t = wr t
tiTable LLTable
tiTable LLTable: ∀ t ∈ N
ms wr ws r lid ′ Assumption
1 〈〉 y 〈〉 〈〉 lid
2 x y 〈〉 〈〉 ft.x x 6= 〈〉, ft.x ∈ N
3 x 〈〉 〈〉 〈〉 lid x 6= 〈〉, ft.x ∈ Data
4 x y x 〈req〉 lid x 6= 〈〉, ft.x ∈ Data, y 6= 〈〉, ft.x = lid
5 x y 〈〉 〈〉 lid x 6= 〈〉, ft.x ∈ Data, y 6= 〈〉, ft.x 6= lid
Remark:
The 3rd line of the table LLTable will never be used by the specification Log-
icalLayer because of the assumptions and the properties of the specification
Wire.
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4 Related work
4.1 CAN
There have been very few formal approaches targeting analysis of CAN protocol.
A formal method for analysis of automotive systems (also CAN-based) was
discussed in [5]. A frame packing algorithms for automotive applications was
introduced in [12].
Van Osch and Smolka proposed a finite-state method for analysis of the
CAN bus protocol. Saha and Roy presented a formal specification of the time
triggered version of CAN Protocol, see [11].
4.2 FocusST
FocusSTapproaches presented in [16, 17, 27] aims to apply the engineering
psychology achievements to the design of formal methods, focusing on the spec-
ification phase of a system development process. Its core ideas originated from
the analysis of the Focus framework and also led to an extended version of the
framework, FocusST .
Another approach based on FocusST , allows analysis of component de-
pendencies [19]. This was later extended to framework for formal analysis of
dependencies among services [25].
Model-based analysis of temporal properties using FocusSTwas presented
in [22]. The authors also demonstrate how to implement on FocusSTbasis
time-triggered and event-based view on systems with temporal properties.
Spatio-temporal models for formal analysis and property-based testing were
presented in [1, 2] by Alzahrani et al. The authors aimed to to apply property-
based testing on FocusSTand TLA models with temporal properties.
Zamansky et. al. [28, 28] reviewing some recent large-scale industrial
projects in which formal methods (including FocusST ) have been successfully
applied. The authors also covered some aspects of teaching formal methods for
software engineering, including FocusST , cf. [26, 13].
5 Conclusions
This paper presents a formal specification of the Controller Area Network (CAN)
protocol using FocusST framework. We formally describe core components
of the protocol, which provides a basis for further formal analysis using the
Isabelle/HOL theorem prover [9] using the Focus on Isabelle methodology [14,
18, 15].
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